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Postscript: in early July 2010 the New Zealand Minister for Communications Steven Joyce 
announced fundamental changes to the structure and regulation of the New Zealand 
Government‟s Ultra-Fast Broadband Initiative. The changes were deemed necessary in order to 
achieve uptake targets sufficient to underpin the business case for both government and private 
sector investment. For a discussion of those changes and how they interact with the issues raise in 
this paper please refer to: Heatley, D. & Howell, B. (2010). “UFBI 2.0: Revised separation 
boundaries may partially address pricing and uptake limitations in New Zealand fibre broadband 
model, but significant competition policy problems remain”. Current Comment. 2010 No. 2. 
ISCR. Available from: http://www.iscr.org.nz/n594.html. 
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Abstract 
The Australian and New Zealand governments have both decided that substantial government 
investment is required to accelerate the deployment of new nationwide fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) 
networks. This paper examines the two proposals in light of the crucial role of price 
discrimination in enabling rapid and early uptake of a new technology with a natural monopoly 
cost structure, given the assumptions that both networks will be subject to provisions that separate 
elements of network ownership from retail operations, and both will face competition from other 
(vertically integrated) network technologies.   
 
Whilst price discrimination enables a monopolist to maximise profits by extracting surplus from 
consumers, when the firm has a natural monopoly cost structure it also enables the firm to 
increase welfare by accessing scale economies (static efficiency gains) and to introduce the 
technology earlier than under the counterfactual of a single price (dynamic efficiency gains).  
However, vertical separation of network and retail functions and regulated „open access‟ and 
„equivalence‟ requirements, used as regulatory tools to increase retail competition and constrain 
price and non-price discrimination by monopoly network operators, restricts the ability of a new 
network operator to use its price structure to introduce the technology in a timely manner and to 
gain access to welfare-enhancing scale economies.  In a competitive environment, when the new 
(frontier) network must build its customer base principally from the substitution of customers 
from the existing (legacy) natural monopoly networks (which may be vertically integrated and 
engaging in price discrimination themselves), the non-discriminatory provisions of structural 
separation impose substantial limitations upon the regulated firm‟s business case.    
 
Both the Australian and New Zealand FTTH proposals impose separation and non-discrimination 
requirements as a precondition for government financing, although they differ in their approaches 
in respect of both the point at which the separation must be enforced and the extent of 
competition anticipated from existing network operators.  Whilst neither proposal enables the full 
efficiency gains available from producing at maximum efficient scale to be realised, the 
Australian proposal, with integration of Layer 1 and 2 operators and acquisition of the competing 
copper access network appears to offer efficiency and substitution advantages over the New 
Zealand proposal, which requires separation between layer 1 and 2 operators and provides no 
clear view of the competitive positioning of the FTTH network relative to the legacy copper 
access rival. 
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Introduction 
Over the past five years, near-universal availability of fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) internet access 
has become a reality in countries such as Japan, Singapore and Korea. Substantial deployment of 
fibre-based networks has also been occurring in countries such as the United States, the 
Netherlands, Finland and Denmark. Fuelled by concerns about maintaining future international 
competitiveness (in particular in relation to increasingly important Asian markets where fibre is 
already widely deployed) both the Australian and New Zealand governments have pledged to 
invest substantial sums into the construction of nationwide fast FTTH broadband networks
1
. In 
both countries it is envisaged that connections delivering 100Mbps both downloading from and 
uploading to the internet will be available to the vast majority of households within ten years
2
.  
 
The Australian National Broadband Network (NBN)
3
 and the New Zealand Ultra-Fast Broadband 
Initiative (UFB)
4
 proposals share many common features. Both presume that a single FTTH 
network with a geographic monopoly
5
 will be built, and that public financing at an early stage (i.e. 
in advance of voluntary commitment of private sector investment) will accelerate its deployment 
and the accrual of the presumed attendant benefits
6
. As the creation of a single infrastructure 
invokes concerns about potential negative consequences from the exertion of market power, and 
in order to encourage competition and innovation in those non-monopoly parts of the industry 
where it is deemed achievable, both proposals mandate vertical separation between the (upstream) 
infrastructure owner(s) and (downstream) retailers of services provided using that infrastructure, 
and an “open access”7, “non-discriminatory” pricing regime whereby downstream retailers are 
charged identical prices for identical services by the upstream infrastructure owner(s)
8
.  
 
However the proposals differ in some important respects on where the boundaries of the 
structurally separate firms will be drawn, and competitive positioning of the fibre firms relative to 
                                                   
1 Grimes, Ren & Stevens (2009). 
2 The Australian target is coverage of 90-93% of the population, whereas the New Zealand target is 75%. 
3 http://www.dbcde.gov.au/broadband/national_broadband_network 
4 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary____41902.aspx  
5 Thereby avoiding potential duplication of investment resulting when two or more firms building fast 
broadband access networks.  
6 See Howell & Grimes (2010) for a discussion of the policy assessment process of the likely benefits from 
fast fibre networks.  
7
 Whereby the network operator is required to sell elements of access to the network to any access seeker at 
regulated rates (Hausman & Sidak, 2005).  
8 In order to prevent the foreclosure of downstream competitors by the network operator making access 
available to its own downstream firm under more attractive terms than those offered to competitors (Xavier 
& Ypsilanti, 2004). 
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the incumbent copper network providers. Based upon the ISO reference model
9
, generic structural 
separation proposals identify three „layers‟ within the supply and distribution of FTTH (and other 
data communications) networks: Layer 1, or the „physical layer‟, which provides the dark fibre 
connection between the household and a local aggregation node (akin to copper connections 
under local loop unbundling); Layer 2, or the „data link layer‟, whereby dark fibre links are 
converted into bitstream connections over which internet traffic can be passed (akin to wholesale 
services offered by incumbent telecommunications companies, and by unbundling entrants using 
their own equipment in incumbents‟ facilities); and Layer 3 or „network layer‟ services whereby 
retailers (for example, internet service providers or ISPs) offer cross-network communication and 
data access plans to consumers.  
 
The Australian proposal presumes that the government-owned and operated firm (NBNCo) will 
provide all Layer 1 and Layer 2 services. The acquisition of existing Telstra copper network 
assets for an agreed price is a fundamental component of the planned migration of Australian 
DSL and hybrid fibre-coaxial (HFC) broadband consumers to the fibre network. The Australian 
proposals allow for the possibility of NBNCo engaging in aggressive (government-subsidised) 
price-based competition to induce customers of other competing fixed-line networks, such as 
Optus‟ HFC network, to substitute to the new fibre network if this is necessary achieve the 
desired level of migration in specific locations
10
. Similarly, proposed regulatory constraints on the 
building of competing fibre networks should ensure a monopoly on fixed-line broadband 
provision for NBNCo. 
 
Structural components of the Australian proposal and the competitive positioning of the FTTH 
networks in relation to other infrastructures are depicted in Figure 1. 
                                                   
9 Zimmermann (1980). 
10 Australian Government (2010). 
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Figure 1. Structural Components and Competitive Positioning of New Zealand and Australian FTTH Proposals 
 
By contrast, the New Zealand proposal assumes that up to 33 regional geographic monopoly 
public-private partnership firms (UFBCos) will be created to deliver Layer 1 services
11
. 
Government funding is attached to the provision of Layer 1 services only. A UFBCo may offer 
Layer 2 services over their own network; however it must provide Layer 1 services to itself and to 
all other Layer 2 service providers on equivalent terms
12
. Importantly, Layer 3 firms (managing 
the retail relationships with end consumers) are precluded from having a controlling stake in 
                                                   
11 These firms are described as „Local Fibre Companies‟ (LFCs) in the Ministry of Economic Development 
documentation. 
12 http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/70609/Invitation-to-Participate.pdf. Appendix 4. 
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Layer 1 firms. No official position has been taken in the New Zealand plans as to the role 
Telecom‟s new fibre-to-the-node (FTTN) network will play in the construction of the new fibre 
network or the migration of consumers to it from existing DSL connections
13
. The FTTN network, 
developed as a consequence of binding undertakings entered into by Telecom and the government 
in 2007, is currently delivering 10Mbps to 78% of the population. VDSL speeds of 40Mbps will 
be available to 60% of the population by end of 2010, and 80% of lines are expected to be 
20Mbps capable by the end of 2011
14
. 
 
Despite their apparent „open access‟ and non-discrimination‟ similarities, the differing 
approaches to separation boundaries and the involvement of the respective incumbent copper-
based telecommunications providers will result in two very different environments in which both 
the price level and price structure of the products offered to retailers and ultimately consumers 
will be set. There is broad agreement in both countries that ongoing financial viability of the 
FTTH networks relies upon rapid and early consumer uptake, and that this will to a large extent 
depend upon extensive migration of existing fixed-line internet consumers (both DSL and HFC) 
to the new networks.  
 
In Australia, acquisition by NBNCo of Telstra‟s copper assets means migration of the existing 
fixed-line broadband customers serviced on the incumbent‟s copper infrastructure (80% of fixed-
line broadband market) can be managed without fear of extensive price-based competition from 
the dominant fixed-line infrastructure provider (albeit that some competition might be expected 
from HFC networks and other operators with pre-existing fibre networks
15
). By contrast, unless a 
similar agreement is made within New Zealand, the incumbent operator and its unbundling and 
wholesale customers (who collectively have 93% market share) will be competing for the same 
fixed-line broadband customers with the UFBCos and their associated downstream firms. 
                                                   
13 It is noted that Telecom submitted a non-conforming response to the request for proposals. On 23 May 
2010 the firm announced that it would investigate the feasibility of full structural separation of its copper 
network from other operations in exchange for the government considering involvement of the firm in the 
UFB project and revisions of the current copper network regulatory arrangements and undertakings 
between the firm and the government (for example, the Telecommunications Service Order, which binds 
the firm to provide universal national copper network coverage at geographically averaged prices and with 
a mandated flat-rate local voice calling tariff). At the Investor Briefing in Sydney on May 27, the Chief 
executive clarified that structural separation was only one of a range of possible strategic options the firm 
was considering.  
http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/irol/91/91956/investorday/ChiefExecutiveOfficerTelecomGroupPaulReynoldsStrategyUpdate.pdf. 
14 Communications Day June 17, 2010, p.1. 
15 Competition from mobile and fixed-wireless broadband can also be expected, however the authors of 
both Australian and New Zealand proposals have downplayed this threat. 
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Aggressive price-based competition from copper (and other infrastructure) providers threatens the 
ability of the UFBCos to obtain sufficient customers quickly enough to generate the returns 
necessary to induce both the degree of private sector investment expected and the anticipated 
levels of capital cost recovery that are fundamental to the delivery of the New Zealand UFB 
policy.  
 
Clearly, the price levels of FTTH connections relative to existing infrastructure offerings will play 
a key role in inducing customer substitution. Less well-articulated, but nonetheless also extremely 
important, is the role of price structure
16
. Historically, network industries with a degree of market 
power (even in the presence of some (oligopolistic) competition, e.g. mobile telephony) have 
achieved widespread and early uptake by engaging in various forms of price discrimination. 
Examples include bundling of services with other products
17
, two-part tariffs where usage 
charged above cost subsidises connections sold below cost, and multiple product offerings sold at 
prices that reflect customers‟ relative willingness to pay rather than the costs of production in a 
manner that enables greater total welfare (both consumer and producer) to be delivered than 
under the counterfactual of a single, cost-based price
18
. Key differences exist between the two 
proposals with regard to the ability to engage in price discrimination in order to advance the 
objective of rapid substitution. 
 
As Australia‟s single integrated Layer-1-and- 2 NBNCo will be offering a wide range of products 
to its wholesale customers, it will be in a position to engage in a limited amount of imperfect, yet 
still welfare-enhancing price discrimination over a range of product variants (i.e. classic Ramsey-
Boiteux prices, albeit with customer valuations proxied by the valuations of Layer 3 retailers) in 
order to better achieve the multiple goals of wide and early deployment, rapid and widespread 
uptake, low average costs of production and rapid recovery of fixed costs outlaid whilst similarly 
maximising welfare from the provision of faster services. By contrast, New Zealand‟s Layer 1 
UFB firms, bound to offering a single dark fibre product at non-discriminatory terms
19
, in 
                                                   
16 Howell (2008).  
17 For example, equipment (such as handset and modem bundling) or complementary services (such as 
television content).  
18 That is, classic „Ramsey-Boiteux Prices‟, where the ratio of the relative markups over marginal cost of 
two (or more) services is equal to the ratio of the inverse elasticities of demand for the services (Laffont & 
Tirole, 2002).  
19 UFB firms are required to offer a „specified‟ dark-fibre product on these terms. They are permitted to 
charge a premium for a dedicated fibre over a shared fibre; however this premium must be cost based. NBN 
data suggests that the relevant cost increment is around 8%, so the price differential will be small. These 
two products should be suitable for all homes and the great majority of businesses. 
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competition with an ADSL provider similarly bound to offer non-discriminatory prices, will be 
unable to garner the full benefits of scale economies available under integration and price 
discrimination. Rather, they will be required to forfeit any surpluses from price discrimination 
enabled as a consequence of product variety to the Layer 2 and 3 operators, rather than being able 
to use them to offset the high fixed costs of Layer 1 network deployment. The New Zealand 
approach will lead to higher average costs and prices, and very likely handicaps the rapid 
deployment and development of uptake of the UFBCos‟ fibre networks, and increases the risks of 
failing to achieve ongoing financial viability relative to the Australian NBNCo counterpart. 
However, the limitations of structural separation mean than in neither country can the full range 
of price discrimination practices, as is observed in countries where the fibre providers face no 
structural separation mandates, be utilised to accelerate the substitution of existing broadband 
consumers to the new networks. 
 
This paper explores the implications of the different approaches towards separation and price 
discrimination in the Australian and New Zealand fibre proposals for the ability to achieve the 
stated objectives of rapid deployment and uptake, and ongoing financial viability, especially 
given that they must be obtained substantially in advance of extensive consumer demand 
developing for the network‟s high-speed capabilities (relative to already-deployed close 
substitutes).  
 
Section 1 outlines the key theories of price discrimination, and the ways in which price structure 
can be utilised to bring forward the time at which both a social planner will find it welfare-
enhancing and a business will find it profitable to invest in a new natural monopoly technology 
where demand for it is still relatively immature. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
competitive environment into which the NBN and UFB are being introduced, and draws upon 
insights on demand patterns and price structures from other countries where FTTH networks are 
widely deployed in competition with other infrastructures. This section highlights the challenges 
of inducing substitution in an environment where there is as yet little evidence of significant 
consumer willingness to pay substantial price premiums for network speeds appreciably faster 
than current incumbent offerings, and where technological capacity for enhancing the speed of 
existing technologies still exists. Given these constraints, and given the long history of price 
discrimination across different speed offerings, it would appear to be very difficult to achieve 
substitution and uptake objectives without price discrimination in the sale of FTTH products. 
Section 3 compares and contrasts the potential for price discrimination to be profitably and 
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beneficially deployed to enhance the economic potential of each of the Australian and New 
Zealand FTTH network proposals, given the structural boundaries and competitive restrictions 
imposed by those proposals. Section 4 concludes.  
1 Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination in a Natural Monopoly 
Technologies with high fixed costs typically have a downward-sloping average cost of supply as 
quantity produced increases (economies of scale), as illustrated by the curve (S) in Figure 2. This 
occurs because marginal costs (MC) are small by comparison, and either constant or decreasing 
as the quantity produced increases, so the shape of the average cost curve is dominated by the 
spreading of the fixed costs over an increasing production volume.  
 
  
Figure 2. Natural Monopoly Cost Structure  Figure 3. Demand Curves 
 
As long as the total quantity that can be sold in a market lies in the region where the average cost 
curve is decreasing (i.e. economies of scale exist), it will be most efficient for only one firm to 
produce all units, leading to the creation of a „natural monopoly‟. Given the average cost curve S 
in Figure 2, it costs $PA to produce each of QA units. However, if more units are produced (i.e. 
QB), it costs only $PB < $PA to produce each of those QB units. A single supplier faced with such a 
cost structure thus finds it most profitable (i.e. least costly) to make as many units as the market is 
prepared to buy at a given price. Indeed, it is in the interests of the efficiency of the economy 
generally if a supplier with such a cost structure is protected from competitive entry by other 
suppliers with similar cost structures, in order to ensure that the units are produced at this least 
possible cost. For example, if a competitor with the same cost structure enters the market and 
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sells QC = (QB – QA) units, then the average cost of production for the total QB units will rise. The 
QA units produced by the incumbent rise in cost to $PA each, and as QC < QA, the entrant‟s 
average cost per unit $PC is even higher than $PA.  
 
The higher are the fixed costs of production relative to the (approximately constant) marginal 
costs, the more likely it will be that a natural monopoly will arise. As the fixed costs of producing 
goods such as fibre networks are very large (e.g. acquiring development consents and rights-of-
way, building exchange or interchange facilities, digging trenches and laying fibre), and the 
marginal costs of making another unit are relatively small (connecting up a single household to a 
connection already laid in the street, delivering information along that connection), they tend to 
exhibit characteristic natural monopoly cost structures. Technological change has vastly reduced 
the costs of communication equipment over recent years and hence reduced the likelihood of true 
natural monopolies occurring in some geographical markets (e.g. densely populated urban 
environments
20
). However natural monopoly cost structures (and their attendant monopolistic 
consequences) may still be relevant where addressable markets are small (i.e. towards the left of 
the average cost curve, where it is relatively steep and economies of scale are significant).  
 
Suppliers of goods with natural monopoly characteristics thus seek to deploy their infrastructure 
widely in order to deliver the largest number of units at the lowest possible unit cost. To recover 
the large fixed costs, it is desirable to sell as many connections as possible as quickly as possible. 
However, the price that the supplier can charge is determined by the willingness of consumers to 
pay for the good. When there are few close substitutes for the good, and consumers value the 
good highly (i.e. their demand is said to be inelastic and the demand curve is steep – D1 in Figure 
3), the supplier can charge a high price (i.e. ∆P1 above cost $P1, in order to maximise profits – 
measured by the sum of shaded areas F and G) without altering the number of units sold very 
much (∆Q1). However, the more substitutes consumers have for the good, or the more they prefer 
to spend their constrained budgets on other goods, the flatter is the demand curve (i.e. it is said to 
be more elastic – D2). The same change in price ∆P1 alters the quantity sold by a much larger 
amount (∆Q2), and the profit yielded is only area F. Thus, when demand is more elastic, the 
supplier‟s ability to set the price in order to maximise profit is more constrained.  
 
                                                   
20  Where two or more networks technologies can be deployed without reducing efficiency as each is 
operating in the flat, right-hand side of the average cost curve in Figure 1 where returns to scale are 
approximately constant. 
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The total number of units that can be sold, and ultimately the average cost of the units produced 
and sold at a price that at least covers the costs of production (i.e. suppliers will not incur a loss, 
and will therefore find it worthwhile producing the good), is determined by the slopes and 
intersection point of the average cost and demand curves. As long as a price and quantity can be 
found where the cost of production falls below the marginal consumer willingness to pay 
(demand) for that quantity, the supplier will find it worthwhile (profitable) to produce the good. 
However, early in the lifecycle of a technology, when the value of the technology is either 
unknown or unproven to the majority of potential customers, the total potential market (Q) is 
quite small. Although the most likely initial customers individually are highly-valuing early 
adopters (and the demand curve likely quite steep, as a completely new technology has no close 
substitutes), if the fixed costs are very high it may be that the average cost of production is so 
high that the demand curve falls below the average cost curve over the relevant quantity range 
(Figure 4). In this case, the demand and supply curves do not intersect. There is no single price 
and quantity at which the technology can be sold that enables the producer to recover the costs of 
deployment. In these circumstances, the good will not be produced as there is no way for the 
producer to recover production costs. Potential consumer surplus (welfare) available to the small 
number of high-valuing consumers is forfeited from the economy. 
 
If it is deemed sufficiently valuable for the good to be produced (e.g. it is an „essential good‟, the 
benefits of which are so large that it cannot be contemplated from a societal perspective that it not 
be produced and consumed), then it is possible to induce its supply by subsidising its production 
(e.g. from taxation). However, subsidies lead to reductions in economic efficiency (welfare) as 
they require taxes to be levied in the markets for other goods and services in order to fund the 
transfer to the subsidised market.  Nonetheless, it is still possible under some circumstances for 
the natural monopoly good to be profitably produced (without decreasing welfare elsewhere in 
the economy by taxing other activities) by engaging in price discrimination
21
.  
 
Assume a quantity Q2 can be produced at an average cost per unit of $P3. The downward-sloping 
demand curve means that (if sufficient identifying information is available) it is possible to 
subdivide consumers into two (or more) groups according to their different willingness to pay for 
the technology. A higher price $P1 can be charged to the Q1 consumers with willingness to pay 
above $P1, rendering them with consumer surplus represented by the area of triangle C. The 
                                                   
21 The form of price discrimination discussed here (different prices to different groups of customers) is 
termed “third-degree price discrimination” (Pigou, 1932; Carlton & Perloff, 2005).  
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remaining Q2 – Q1 customers can be charged price $P2, leaving them with consumer surplus 
represented by the red-outlined triangle (E plus part of B). The profits made by selling Q1 units at 
a price $P1 above average unit cost $P3 (rectangular area A) can be used to offset the losses made 
by selling Q2 – Q1 at a price $P2 below average unit cost $P3 (rectangular area B). As long as the 
size of the profits exceeds the size of the losses, (area A exceeds area B), the supplier also makes 
a net profit (producer surplus) so will be sufficiently induced to produce the good without the 
need for a social planner to intervene by offering taxpayer-funded subsidies. Price discrimination 
thus leads to higher total welfare being generated (the sum of consumer and producer surpluses C 
+ E + A – B) than under either the subsidised counterfactual or where no production of the good 
occurs. From a distributional perspective, higher-valuing consumers in effect subsidise the 
consumption of lower-valuing ones
22
. Moreover, a welfare-maximising social planner will seek to 
maximise the quantity sold subject to the producer breaking even (i.e. area A is no smaller than 
area B). This was the classic approach taken to the use of price discrimination in telephony 
networks when they were government-owned and operated.  
 
B
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Figure 4. Price Discrimination Allows Introduction of a Technology Not Produced at a Single Price 
 
Price discrimination can also be applied to increase total welfare relative to the case of monopoly 
pricing, even when the cost curve falls below the demand curve (Figure 5). Assuming the 
                                                   
22 In a manner similar to progressive taxation where higher earners pay more tax lower earners. 
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monopolist sets price and quantity to maximise profit – that is at the point of maximum vertical 
distance between the demand and average cost curves where quantity Q1 produced at average cost 
C1 will be sold at price $P1, generating consumer surplus A and producer surplus B. However, 
both producer and consumer surplus increase if Q2 units are produced at average cost $P2, with 
the additional Q2 – Q1 units being sold at the new (lower) average cost. The original Q1 customers 
are no worse off, but the producer surplus now increases by the size of the cost savings from 
making the original Q1 units at lower average cost $P2 (area E) whilst the new Q2 – Q1 customers 
receive additional consumer welfare represented by area F which would not be achieved under a 
single (monopoly) price. Both aggregate consumer and producer surplus (and hence total 
welfare – a Pareto improvement) are therefore enhanced by the practice of such price 
discrimination
23
. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Price Discrimination Increases the Quantity Produced 
 
No explicit policy intervention is required to achieve this outcome: the price structure creates 
incentives for a profit-maximising infrastructure owner to act in a way consistent with 
maximisation of social welfare (although some individuals – often those with higher valuations 
and hence paying higher prices – may object to such pricing strategies, and hence advocate for 
price equivalence using equity grounds).  
                                                   
23 Varian (1985). 
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Price discrimination is quite common in markets for a wide variety of goods with high fixed and 
low marginal costs, including computer software (e.g. Microsoft Office is sold in Professional 
and Academic versions), books and movies (early versus standard release), live performances 
(early purchase versus „rush tickets‟ sold on the day of performance), and travel (discounts for 
off-peak services and for specific customer types such as senior citizens). When telephony, 
railway and electricity networks were in their infancy, price discrimination between (less 
demand-elastic) business and (more demand-elastic) residential consumers was the norm. Whilst 
some policy-makers may deem charging different prices to different consumer groups inequitable 
and therefore undesirable, Figures 4 and 5 illustrate that if the cost structure for the good exhibits 
natural monopoly characteristics, mandating a single price for the good will result in a higher 
average cost of production, a smaller number of customers and less welfare in total („static‟ 
efficiency is less) compared to the case of price discrimination. Furthermore, under the 
circumstances of Figure 4, price discrimination also delivers higher levels of „dynamic‟ efficiency 
as it brings forward the time at which a new technology is made available to consumers. Under 
the counterfactual of a single price, production would be delayed until consumer demand grew 
sufficiently (i.e. the demand curve moves out to a position where it sits above the average cost 
curve – D') to enable the producer to recover production costs.  
 
The ability to practice price discrimination ultimately depends upon the extent that the supplier 
can identify consumer subgroups with different preferences and valuations, and can prevent high-
valuing ones from masquerading as low-valuing ones in order to buy at the lower price. If the 
product can be customised for each group (and thereby rendered less useful for other customer 
groups) at relatively low cost, many different products costing a similar amount each can be 
produced and sold to the different customer groups at very different prices according to their 
varying willingness to pay („versioning‟). For example, it costs Microsoft very little to set the soft 
switch to turn off access to advanced software features, thereby enabling professional and 
academic versions of its software to be sold at very different prices. Likewise, identical network 
services can be sold under different contractual terms to different customer groups, or software 
switches set at exchanges or cabinets to customise the speed of service an individual broadband 
consumer receives.  
 
As long as the prices at which the products are sold differ according to customer willingness to 
pay rather than the cost of production, then „versioning‟ similar-cost products is in essence price 
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discrimination. Ramsey and Boiteux have both separately demonstrated that social welfare is 
maximised subject to the firm‟s profit being non-negative (i.e. all costs are met) when the price 
for each such „versioned‟ product is inversely proportional to its demand elasticity24. As the 
market demand curve is the aggregate of the separate demand curves for each of the product 
variants, and the higher-valuing consumers are those with the more inelastic demand curves, it is 
now clear that price discrimination by „versioning‟ can be used as part of a strategy to gain access 
to economies of scale at the same time as bringing forward the time of investing in producing a 
new product with natural monopoly cost characteristics
25
.  
 
2. Price Discrimination in FTTH Networks: an International Context 
The defining characteristic of the market for internet access services since they first became 
widely available in the 1990s has been a rapid increase in both the capability and availability of  
data transmission speeds (both upload and download) available to end users. Whereas in 2000 the 
average advertised downstream speed of broadband connections in OECD countries was less than 
500Kbps
26
, by 2008 this had increased by a factor of 34 to more than 17Mbps
27
. Simultaneously, 
broadband internet connections have become widespread, to the point that the technology is 
approaching diffusion maturity in many countries
28
. Yet whilst faster connections have enabled 
the more widespread use of applications such as audio and high-definition video streaming, peer-
to-peer exchanges and sophisticated video gaming, the applications utilised by the vast majority 
of residential consumers can be quite adequately delivered to most consumers using currently-
available and future-projected upgrades to DSL and HFC networks.  
 
Even though a wide variety of broadband speeds is available in many countries, most residential 
users appear unwilling to pay substantially more for faster connections (i.e. although a few 
individuals will pay a premium for speed, the demand for fast broadband connections quickly 
becomes quite elastic as the number of consumers increases), at least in advance of their ability to 
gain benefits from applications that can only be used with the faster connections
29
 (Figure 6).  
                                                   
24 Ramsey (1927); Boiteux (1956). 
25 Shapiro & Varian (1999).  
26 Assessed from speeds surveyed by the OECD, pp 52-3 in OECD (2001). 
27 OECD (2009) p 107.  
28
 The cumulative average growth rate of broadband connections between 2005 and 2007 in early leader 
Korea was only 1.38% (OECD, 2009, p 128).  
29 This point was first made with respect to the payment of a premium for faster broadband when dial-up 
connections were the norm, but is equally applicable to the availability and purchase of faster broadband 
connections (Howell, 2003). 
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Figure 6. Likely Demand Curve for Fast Broadband Connections 
For example, despite having the choice of one of the OECD‟s broadest ranges of speeds and 
technology types, only around one third of United States residential broadband consumers have 
opted to pay a price premium to purchase a broadband connection faster than their provider‟s 
standard-offer speed
30
. Even so, the average price paid for premium-speed connections was only 
1.2 times the average price paid for standard-speed connections
31
. As the fastest connections 
contemporaneously offered by AT&T (ADSL – 10,000Kbps), Time Warner (HFC – 15,000Kbps) 
and Verizon (FTTH – 50,000Kbps) exceeded the price of the respective firms‟ standard-speed 
(768Kbps) offerings by a factor of 3.4, 2.5 and 7 respectively
32
, it would appear that despite a 
wide array of speeds on offer, the average premium-speed connections actually purchased in the 
United States do not substantially exceed the speed of the standard offering.  
 
The apparent lack of willingness to pay substantial premia for faster broadband connections likely 
derives from the fact that, although there is a range of bandwidth-intensive applications from 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
30 Horrigan (2010a).  
31 Horrigan (2009).  
32 OECD (2009). p.309.  
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which some consumers may derive tangible benefits when using faster connections, these 
applications still remain in large part the domain of specific niche user groups rather than of 
mainstream users. Historically, it has been observed that a small proportion of users consume a 
disproportionately large share of network resources (i.e. mean volume of data downloaded is 
substantially larger than median)
33
. This occurs because the applications commonly reported as 
the most important and frequently used by the majority of broadband users are not bandwidth-
intensive, so rarely necessitate the purchase of super-fast connections to render satisfactory 
experiences for the end-user.  
 
United States evidence from the Pew internet surveys confirms that the demand for applications 
requiring fast broadband connections is far from substantial. Fewer than 50% of broadband users 
have ever engaged in bandwidth-intensive activities such as playing games online or downloading 
or streaming video. Most-valued applications for the „average‟ user include low-intensity 
activities such as buying products online, obtaining local national and international news (over 
80% of users), online banking (70%) and social networking (55%). Of those consumers 
purchasing premium-speed broadband connections (one third of broadband purchasers), only 
67% had ever watched an online video or viewed online content on video-sharing site (e.g. 
YouTube or Google Video), and only 23% reported undertaking such activities on a daily basis. 
Only 20% of the premium-speed purchasers had ever downloaded or shared content on peer-to-
peer sites, and fewer than 5% undertook such activities on a daily basis. These percentages for 
premium-speed subscribers are not substantially different from the statistics for all broadband 
connection subscribers (60% and 20% for video-watching; 17% and 3% for peer-to-peer 
exchange)
34
, consistent with the hypothesis that the plethora of high-speed plans currently offered 
is most likely a reflection of supply-side preferences rather than a response to application-driven 
consumer demands for faster services as a consequence of consumers having large appetites for 
applications that can only be used with a very fast connection.  
 
Furthermore, technological development is rendering competitor technologies ever more capable. 
VDSL speeds in excess of 100Mbps symmetrical (upstream and downstream) are already feasible 
using copper, DOCSIS 3.0-enhanced HFC infrastructure is already delivering speeds in excess of 
200Mbps symmetrical and early trials of LTE cellular technology are reporting speeds in the 
vicinity of 100Mbps. As it is likely that enhancing existing networks to achieve these speeds will 
                                                   
33 See, for example, Howell (2003).  
34 Horrigan (2010b); Horrigan (2008).  
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be less costly than building completely new fibre networks, it is not at all clear that, given current 
applications, fibre technologies have a natural advantage even with respect to delivering high 
speeds. Moreover, by their very nature, fixed-line connections restrict consumers to accessing the 
internet at a specific location. As has been evidenced in the voice telephony market, consumers 
are willing to pay a positive price premium for mobility, even though the quality of mobile 
services may be lower than fixed line ones.  
 
Rather, evidence is emerging that many consumers are choosing to spend their (constrained) 
household communications budgets on a portfolio of connection types rather than a single fixed-
line connection. In Quarter 4 2009, the average speed of broadband connections purchased 
worldwide fell for the first time ever as demand for mobile connections to service an increasing 
array of personal devices (e.g. iPhones, Kindles, data sticks etc.) grew
35
 and the pool of non-
broadband users decreased in an increasingly mature fixed-line market. As any extra money to 
purchase more expensive residential fibre connections must come from decreases in spending on 
other items, and as the growth of household expenditure on communications services has been 
declining since 2004
36
, it begs the question of exactly which spending, will be sacrificed in order 
to fund household fibre first purchase. Such spending will occur only if the benefits from fibre 
purchase exceed those achieved from consumption of the sacrificed items.  
 
Given that there is little compelling evidence to suggest that pent-up consumer demand for faster 
broadband connections makes their imminent deployment essential to liberate substantial 
application-based welfare gains for which consumers are willing to pay, why are suppliers 
engaging in the deployment of ever-faster connections? One plausible explanation is that, given 
an investment has already been made in a network (i.e. capacity is available) and a customer has 
already purchased a connection, it is a relatively low-cost activity to alter the speed of the 
connection in question. By offering a menu of speeds, each one of which likely costs a similar 
amount to deliver (versioning) at vastly different prices (price discrimination using Ramsey-
Boiteux prices), network operators can induce consumers to self-select into different groups by 
opting for the version that best meets their requirements, and hence signal their willingness to pay 
for services with different qualities.  
 
                                                   
35 Akamai State of the Internet Report Q 4 2009, as reported in Communications Day April 22 2010, p 10.  
36 OECD (2009, p 35).  
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That is, faster speeds act as a means of extracting a price premium out of high-valuing (and likely 
early-adopter) customers, enabling the practise of welfare-enhancing price discrimination.  With 
such information, network operators can set their price structures such that they can bring forward 
the time at which new networks (e.g. fibre) and/or enhancements (such as FTTN and DOCSIS3.0) 
can be deployed relative to the counterfactual of a single price for each technology type. As the 
demand curve for faster broadband connections is likely nonlinear, with only a small number of 
consumers willing to pay very high prices (inelastic demand) and the vast majority having very 
little propensity for paying much for speed (elastic demand) (Figure 6) practise of price 
discrimination is eminently feasible. Slower low-price (and even below cost) connections can be 
sold to the vast majority of low-valuing consumers, increasing the total number of customers 
connected and thereby reducing the network operator‟s average cost per connection, whilst 
simultaneously extracting profits from high-valuing consumers purchasing faster connections, in 
order to both bring forward the time of deployment and (if necessary) subsidise the connections 
sold below cost to obtain necessary scale.  
 
OECD evidence appears to bear out the price discrimination hypothesis. All OECD countries 
offer broadband connections over a wide range of speeds, both uploading to and downloading 
from the internet. With the exception of Japan and Korea, where all fibre connections are offered 
at 100Mbps symmetrical, fibre providers are competing with DSL and HFC technologies 
principally by replicating the speeds offered by those other technologies, rather than relying upon 
high speed-based differentiation to attract customers. For example, Table 1 shows asymmetric 
fibre connections
37
 are the norm in the United States and the Netherlands, and in Denmark and 
Finland, fibre products are offered over a range of speeds starting lower than the average speed 
(17Mbps) offered across all technologies over the OECD.  
 
  
                                                   
37 Asymmetric speeds offer another mechanism for price discrimination. The majority of connections are to 
net data-consumers, and thus can be expected to select an asymmetric plan over a higher-priced symmetric 
plan. The supplier can use this to extract a price premium from the net data-producers who require at least a 
symmetric plan (typically businesses). 
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Table 1: Fibre Offers in OECD Countries, 2008
38
 
Country Provider Speeds (Kbps) (download/upload) 
Denmark Danske Bredband 512/512; 2000/2000; 10,000/10,000; 20,000/20000; 
25,000/25/000; 50,000/50,000; 100,000/100,000 
Finland Elisa 1000/1000; 2000/2000; 5000/5000; 10,000/10,000; 
50,000/50,000; 100,000/10,000; 100,000/100,000 
The Netherlands KPN 30,000/3000; 50,000/5000; 60,000/6000 
United States Verizon 10,000/2000; 20,000/5000; 20,000/20,000;  
 50,000/20,000 
 
Table 1 also confirms that fibre operators are apparently in large part replicating the low-speed 
offers of the legacy cable and DSL operators. For example, Danske Bredband‟s 512Kbps offering 
does not utilise any of the fast delivery capacities of a fibre network, so can only be offered in 
order to compete directly with existing operators for low-speed customers. A strategy of 
mimicking other technologies is essential if it is substitution of existing low-valuing, low-speed 
customers from existing networks to fibre (in order to achieve scale economies) rather than 
consumer demand for faster connections that is both driving the uptake of fibre connections and 
underpinning the economic case to deploy such networks in the first place.  
 
OECD price data are also consistent with the hypothesis that strategic pricing by fibre operators 
in the presence of other competing networks is necessary to induce substitution. In all four 
countries listed in Table 1, fibre connections are priced either at the same level or below 
equivalent-speed or higher-specified DSL and HFC products
39
. As fibre connections on new 
networks undoubtedly cost more per connection than upgrading existing HFC or DSL networks, 
then undercutting competitors‟ prices for slower connections will be economically sustainable 
(absent subsidies from external sources) only if price discrimination is occurring. That is, price 
premiums charged to high-valuing high-speed consumers are subsidising below-cost connections 
sold to low-valuing ones, and in order to remain economically viable in a market where different 
technologies compete, the premia charged for very fast fibre connections must be proportionately 
much higher than those charged by competing DSL and cable operators. Again, OECD pricing 
data appears to confirm this hypothesis. Very fast fibre connections are sold at a substantial 
premium over the fastest (and most expensive) DSL and HFC connections available (e.g. 
                                                   
38
 Source – OECD (2009, pp 302-309).  
39 E.g. Verizon‟s 10,000/2000 fibre service costs US$42.99 per month compared to US$55.00 for AT&T‟s 
10,000/1500 VDSL product; Danske Bredband‟s 10,000/10,000 fibre connection costs US$(PPP)34.04, 
compared to $45.43 for TDC‟s 10,000/1000 ADSL product and $35.18 for Stofa‟s 10,240/512 HFC 
product. 
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Verizon‟s 50,000/20,000 fibre connection costs $USD139.95, some 30% more than Qwest‟s 
20,000/896 ADSL product; Danske Bredband‟s 100,000/100,000 fibre connection at 
US$(PPP)113.85 is nearly twice the price of TDC‟s 50,000/2000 ADSL product). 
Notwithstanding such pricing strategies, fibre connections comprised only 11% of Danish and 6% 
of United States fixed broadband connections in June 2009
40
. 
 
If the hypothesis of strategic use of price discrimination to engender substitution is plausible then 
the spread of both speeds and prices must be very broad in order to finely segregate consumers. 
Furthermore, the premium products must be priced substantially above cost in order to ensure that 
the surpluses extracted from the small number of high-valuing high-speed (price-inelastic) 
consumers is sufficiently large enough to subsidise the very much larger number of low-speed, 
low-valuing (price-elastic) consumers
41
. Again, OECD pricing data appears to support the 
hypothesis. The price of the fastest speeds offered by individual United States operators exceeded 
the price of the operators‟ respective standard-speed offering by a factor between 2.5 and 7 times. 
Similar price patterns are also observed in Denmark (premium speed 10 times the price of 
standard), Finland (2.4 times), France (4.4 times) and the Netherlands (4.4 times).  
 
Moreover, price discrimination in retail broadband offerings is unlikely to be a new phenomenon. 
Ever since OECD broadband pricing data was first reported in 2001, each country has offered a 
range of both speeds and prices to consumers, regardless of the technology types deployed. All 
that has changed over time is that the range of speeds offered has become much broader in all 
countries and the speed of the base level offering has increased as consumer demand for 
applications requiring faster connections (at the lower end of the speed spectrum) has increased.  
 
It thus appears that in order to encourage widespread take-up in the presence of competition from 
other technologies, given the current application range and willingness to pay, FTTH services 
must gain large customer numbers rapidly in an environment where it is clear that demand for 
very fast services is very elastic over most of the addressable demand curve. The only way that 
such a strategy could financially sustainable would be by engaging in widespread retail price 
discrimination, using a range of speeds offered as a proxy for separating out individual consumers‟ 
willingness to pay, discounting low-speed connections sold to the vast majority of consumers 
below those offered by competitors and charging very high (discriminatory) prices to the 
                                                   
40 OECD Broadband Portal http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/35/39574709.xls  
41 It is noted that in countries where download data-volume caps have been applied, competition based 
upon different speed offerings is less intense, especially in respect of uploading speeds (Howell, 2010a). 
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remainder – i.e. classic price discrimination. However, such a strategy relies upon either there 
being a sufficiently large number of high-valuing customers and an absence of competing high-
speed offers from existing technology providers to ensure that the FTTH operator acquires a 
disproportionate share of the high-valuing customer market, or a sufficiently large addressable 
market that two or more network operators can sell enough connections to each take advantage of 
scale economies in production despite facing competition (i.e. there is no true „natural monopoly 
because the quantity sold (Q) is sufficiently large enough that all operators are selling a quantity 
on the relatively flat portion of their average cost curves).  
 
3. Structural Separation: the Australian and New Zealand Contexts 
The observations in the preceding two sections suggest that providers of Australia‟s and New 
Zealand‟s fast FTTH networks face some very stiff challenges in encouraging existing broadband 
consumers to substitute from their existing technologies. FTTH connections require larger capital 
investment than the already largely-depreciated copper and HFC networks so will necessarily 
have a higher average cost per connection than their competitive counterparts. Unless compelling 
new applications are developed that require capabilities only available on fibre networks, and for 
which consumers are prepared to pay a positive price premium, then widespread substitution to 
FTTH services will likely be very difficult to achieve unless the fibre operators can engage in 
extensive price discrimination and compete aggressively with other network operators and their 
retailers. As both NBNCo and the UFBCos will be competing with existing network providers 
with the capability of replicating many of the features of fibre, their retailers must offer a range of 
speeds replicating HFC and DSL offerings, and an even wider range of price levels and price 
structures (i.e. more finely graduated speed-based price discrimination than already evidenced) in 
order to induce the necessary levels of substitution to achieve low average costs rapidly and 
ultimately obtain financial self-sustainability.  
 
3.1 Structural Separation Precludes Welfare-Enhancing Price Discrimination  
Yet the structural separation requirements that are fundamental to the Australian and New 
Zealand fibre broadband policies materially affect the ability to garner the positive benefits of 
price discrimination. Successful price discrimination relies upon detailed knowledge of individual 
customer valuations of the technology, the ability to segment customers into groups and the 
prevention of high-valuing consumers masquerading as low value ones and product resale. But 
structural separation precludes any positive benefits from price discrimination garnered at Layer 3 
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where retail relationships with end consumers are mediated being passed through to the Layer 1 
and 2 operators in order to offset their very high proportion of fixed costs. It thus impedes the 
ability for network operators to utilise price structures to either access economies of scale in 
production or enable early introduction of a technology exhibiting natural monopoly cost 
characteristics.  In short, it militates against the alignment of incentives facing industry 
participants that would otherwise lead them to adopt strategies consistent with increasing total 
welfare generated from the sector. 
 
Table 2. Open Systems Interconnection Model 
Layer Description Products offered Proportion of cost
42
 
1 Physical layer Dark fibre
43
 70% 
2 Data link layer Bitstream connection between customer 
premises and local or regional points of 
interconnect 
20-25% 
3 Retail layer Cross-network communication; white label 
consumer data plans 
5-10% 
 
As Table 2 illustrates, the bulk of the fixed costs of the Australian (and most likely also the New 
Zealand) FTTH deployment – and hence the area where the proceeds of retail price 
discrimination must be applied in order to minimise average costs – are incurred at Layer 1. To a 
lesser extent, there are also some fixed costs at Layer 2. But at Layer 3, where the greatest ability 
to practice welfare-enhancing retail price discrimination lies (see Table 3), fixed costs – and 
hence the incentive to utilise such pricing structures for either maximising fibre connection 
uptake rates or minimising average costs – are negligible.  
 
                                                   
42 See Exhibit 9-2 in: Australian Government (2010). 
43 „Dark‟ or „unlit‟ fibre means a physical fibre connecting two points. It has no practical use without 
Layer-2 equipment at both ends of the fibre which „lights‟ the fibre and allows the transfer of data. 
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Table 3. Basis for price discrimination 
Layer Possible bases for price discrimination 
1 None – same dark fibre product to everyone44 
2  Maximum speeds (upload and download) 
 Data volume cap (upload and download) 
 Minimum guaranteed speeds (upload and download) 
 Changes to these limits based on time of day 
3 Same bases available at Layer 2 plus: 
 Customer identity 
 Bundling with other goods, services and content 
 Differential rates based on the source or destination of data flows 
 
 
Structural separation has been applied in legacy copper telephony (and electricity) networks 
principally as an instrument to militate against the existing market power of an operator with an 
established, mature network. Specifically, separation precludes Layer 1 and Layer 2 operators 
from having direct engagement with retail customers in order to prevent both price and non-price 
discrimination that may harm competitive entry in downstream Layer 3 markets
45
. By 
constraining the exertion of market power by requiring Layer 1 and 2 operators to supply 
standard products at equivalent terms and prices to all Layer 3 operators, welfare (both static and 
dynamic) otherwise lost from reduced competition at Layer 3 is recovered
46
. This will result in a 
net gain in welfare so long as any gains from increased competition at Layer 3 are greater than 
any attendant welfare losses at Layers 1 and 2.  
 
There is only one circumstance where structural separation of a natural monopoly provider is 
likely to lead unequivocally to welfare gains at Layer 3 without invoking substantial losses at 
Layers 1 and 2 from reduced access to scale economies: where the network is already widely 
deployed, scale economies have already largely been achieved and there is evidence that the 
integrated operator has been using price and non-price discrimination specifically with the 
intention of foreclosing competitive entry
47
. Presuming the network operator has been engaging 
in welfare-enhancing price discrimination (as per Figure 5), the available economies of scale will 
likely have already been captured. As discussed in Section 1, if feasible, an integrated operator 
                                                   
44 While in theory a Layer-1 operator could price discriminate using contractual constraints on the use of 
each dark fibre connection, it could not enforce or monitor compliance without installing its own Layer 2 
equipment. At this point it is duplicating the infrastructure (and costs) of the Layer-2 operator. 
45 Xavier & Ypsilanti (2004); Howell, Meade & O‟Connor (2010). 
46 Economides & White (1995); Cave (2006). 
47 Whinston (1991).  
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will maximise both profits and total welfare by engaging in such a strategy. The quantity 
produced will already be set at the maximum level Q2, where the demand curve intersects with 
the average cost curve. However, an integrated operator faces reduced incentives to engage in the 
development of new Layer 3 products and services offered over the network. Competition 
induced from access regulation and structural separation increases the range of Layer 3 products 
and services available (dynamic efficiency gain). Arguably, such competition also reduces any 
Layer 3 productive (static) inefficiencies within the formerly monopoly provider.  
 
Whilst a greater range of products and services undoubtedly increases consumer welfare, if the 
technology is already widely deployed, the potential to sell more connections (and hence increase 
access to scale economies at Layers 1 and 2) is not large, as the average cost curve beyond Q2 
connections becomes relatively flat. Furthermore, productive efficiency gains at Layer 3 are most 
likely to emanate from changes in the already small marginal costs. Whilst the average cost curve 
may shift down very slightly, its slope will not alter greatly as a consequence of such gains. 
Consequently, altering industry structure by imposing access regulation or structurally separating 
out the Layer 1 and 2 operators in a mature network will very likely induce welfare gains at Layer 
3 without substantially interfering with the underlying industry cost structure
48
. Aside from any 
dynamic welfare gains from Layer 3 product variety, the most significant discernable effect of 
structural separation is likely the wealth transfer from the (formerly) monopoly producer to high-
valuing consumers, who now pay the (single, equalised) market price for their connection. Whilst 
consumer welfare increases as a consequence of the price change, there is no change in total static 
efficiency as a consequence of this reallocation alone.  
 
At any other stage of a network technology‟s life-cycle, however, structural separation49 imposes 
a necessary welfare trade-off between the benefits of increased Layer 3 competition and the 
losses invoked from restricting the ability of Layer 1 and 2 operators to use pricing strategically 
to access scale economies. Whilst Layer 3 operators can engage in price discrimination, without 
direct responsibility for the recovery of the high levels of fixed costs over other parts of the 
network (they purchase their network inputs from lower-layer operators at per-unit prices) they 
face no cost-based incentives to do so. Any price discrimination practices undertaken by 
separated Layer 3 operators are therefore most likely motivated solely by individual profit 
maximisation rather than overall network cost minimisation or welfare maximisation. 
                                                   
48 Only if the productive efficiency gains are very large or the demand curve quite steep at the margin will 
there be a discernable effect upon the average cost of the number of connections sold.  
49 And arguably also access regulation (Howell, Meade & O‟Connor, 2010). 
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Consequently, under structural separation fewer connections will be sold, the average cost of 
production will be higher and total (static) welfare lower (regardless of whether the network is 
operated by a profit-maximising private owner or a welfare-maximising social planner) than 
under an integrated counterfactual. Moreover, dynamic welfare losses are also incurred if the 
separation-induced prohibition on price discrimination delays the time at which investment in the 
new network occurs. At worst, if the demand curve sits above the average cost curve, the network 
will not be deployed, even though it could be provided under a price discrimination scenario.  
 
The extent of static welfare losses arising from separation-induced prohibitions on price 
discrimination will be greatest when the average cost curve is declining most steeply (i.e. in the 
early stages of deployment, when the number of connections likely to be purchased (Q) is 
smallest), and when the demand curve across the addressable market is more inelastic (i.e. as 
usually occurs during the early stages of deployment of a new technology). These are precisely 
the circumstances prevailing at the introduction of a new technology, where the dynamic welfare 
consequences are also greatest. Such analysis suggests that the most costly time to impose 
structural separation and its attendant non-discrimination obligations upon a natural monopoly 
network technology (i.e. when the losses at Layers 1 and 2 are likely to be greatest, and the gains 
at Layer 3 least) is when the network is initially deployed.  
 
Such reasoning brings into question the policy rationale for the imposition of structural separation 
on the Australian and New Zealand FTTH networks. As structural separation is more likely to 
lead to higher welfare in a mature, widely deployed technology, then to impose it as a structure 
upon a new network where there are likely significant short-term costs suggests that, if long-term 
welfare maximisation underlies the policy, then a judgement has been made that the welfare 
gained in the future from competitive neutrality at Layer 3 (Australia) and Layer 2 (New Zealand) 
will be either much larger or more highly-valued than the more immediate benefits of lower net 
costs at the underlying layers and wider early deployment of the technology.  
 
The policy documentation for both the Australian and New Zealand proposals provides no clear 
statements of how the trade-off between gains from Layer 3 competition versus losses at Layers 1 
and 2 was assessed in either coming to the decision to impose separation or in determining 
between which layers the separations would apply.  At best, in the following statement, the New 
Zealand policy makers indicate that their imposition of a separate structure likely derives from 
optimal regulation of a mature, widely deployed technology (the current “best practice” derived 
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from regulatory intervention in copper-based networks where an existing operator has 
demonstrated market power) rather than from a reasoned analysis of the most efficient structures 
for an embryonic new network
50
:  
 “…the government is putting in place up-front design arrangements for the [Local Fibre 
Companies] that are intended to give ex-ante effect to many of the regulatory treatments 
that are current best practice in the telecommunications sector. These include restrictions 
on retailing, retail ownership, requirements to provide specified open access products, 
and equivalence and transparency obligations.” 
 
Whether by accident or design, the effect has been to prioritise the benefits arising ultimately 
from competition at Layer 3 over scale economies at other layers of the network.  Arguably, this 
approach is consistent with an approach in New Zealand in recent years that has favoured 
regulatory and policy choices that increase retail competition over those that might have resulted 
in greater net increases in welfare, but compromise the pursuit of increased retail competition
51
.  
By jumping straight to an industry structure that is better suited to the end-stage of a technology‟s 
lifecycle (and that is in fact the structural equivalent of the functional separation mandates 
imposed upon the incumbent copper network provider in 2007 – see Figure 1), policy-makers 
appear to have excluded the possibility of an evolving industry structure that could both enable 
access to scale economies at an early stage and countervail against the risks of competitive 
foreclosure at a later stage.   
 
By contrast, Australian policy makers have taken a more nuanced position. Despite requiring 
separation of Layer 3 operations, the NBN proposal enables network operator control of product 
differentiation and access to limited price discrimination during the rollout phase (2009-2018) via 
integration of Layer 1 and 2 services.  After 2023, it is envisaged that the Australian industry will 
transition to structural separation above Layer 1
52
 (at which point it will be similar to the New 
Zealand model).  Whilst consistent with the arguments outlined in this paper – that the ability to 
price discriminate (to some degree) is essential during the rollout phase and a transition to 
imposed structural separation is possible (and perhaps desirable) once the network is mature – it 
is impossible to tell if this policy has been arrived as as the outcome of a reasoned analysis from 
weighing the relative static and dynamic efficiency considerations or a consequence of (as seems 
to be the case in the New Zealand case with respect to an existing investment in functional and 
                                                   
50 http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/69988/Ultra-fast-Broadband-Initiative-Overview.pdf. p 16 
51 Howell (2010b). 
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structural separation) other path-dependent artefacts of the Australian telecommunications policy 
development processes.   
 
3.2 Implications of Strategic Interaction under Separation and Competition  
A key assumption underpinning the rationale for pursuing structural separation is that the network 
concerned is truly a natural monopoly – that there is a „bottleneck‟ infrastructure that is all of 
essential, unavoidable and uneconomic to replicate
53
.  If, however, any of these assumptions does 
not hold true, then a separated network may not be just more costly per connection and less 
efficient than a vertically integrated counterfactual, but also at a significant competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis vertically integrated partial and complete substitutes.   
 
Whilst it may be possible for a government to mandate a separate structure for a particular 
infrastructure, with its attendant consequences of a higher average cost of supplying connections, 
the ability for the network operator to recover those costs from consumers will be determined by 
consumer willingness to pay and the range of alternatives available. If there are no close 
substitute networks, the demand curve is relatively inelastic, and it falls below the average cost 
curve over the relevant range of connection numbers, then it is possible for the natural monopoly 
operator(s) at Layers 1 and 2 to set a single price for relevant services prices to Layer 3 operators 
so as they can recover their costs (i.e. without having to rely on ongoing subsidies). The Layer 3 
operators will be able to pass on the higher costs to end consumers without fear of being undercut 
by fully vertically integrated operators or competitors with access to alternative Layer 1 and 2 
infrastructures.  
 
However, in a competitive infrastructure environment, where partial substitutes exist, separated 
Layer 3 operators will struggle to sell their (higher-cost) connections to end consumers unless the 
(Layer 1 and 2) technologies they are delivering contains a compelling quality advantage that will 
induce consumers to pay the significantly higher price premium that separation imposes on their 
network (Layer 3 differentiation alone is insufficient, as these services can be supplied over any 
network infrastructure, including the competing ones). If structurally separate Layer 1 and 2 
operators are precluded from engaging in price discrimination, they are unable to co-ordinate with 
Layer 3 operators to replicate either their competitors‟ cost structures or their retail price 
structures. Vertically-integrated competitors aware of the limitations faced by the separated 
operators can now compete even more aggressively (for example, an even wider array of products 
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and services sold at discriminatory prices) in order to maximise their own market share and 
benefits from scale economies. Such aggressive competition will not necessarily be confined to 
the retail market – for example, as they face no obligations to provide services on equivalent 
terms, competing network operators may use the benefits of scale economies they enjoy in order 
to induce the separated operators‟ Layer 3 retailers to switch their customers to the alternative 
infrastructure. The closer the comparability of the features of the two networks (i.e. the more 
customers view them as perfect, rather than partial, substitutes) the more likely it will be that the 
separated operator(s) will struggle to gain market share and recover costs.  
 
Under these competitive circumstances, it may be extremely difficult for the owners of a separate 
network to obtain even a small number of customers, further inhibiting the ability to access scale 
economies and potentially undermining the very financial viability of the network itself.  
Combined with the discussion in the previous subsection, this suggests that imposing structural 
separation on a nascent network, at least in the absence of other mechanisms to restrict 
competition, is not just likely problematic in respect of maximising welfare, but also imposes 
substantial limitations that hamstring the ability of the separated operators to compete on 
equivalent terms with other networks. The new network may fail to get sufficient new customers 
to cover its fixed and sunk costs, putting pressure on its ongoing financial viability. 
 
3.3 The Australian and New Zealand FTTH Proposals  
The competitive reality is that both the Australian and New Zealand FTTH networks will be 
implemented in an environment where there is already widespread deployment and uptake of 
DSL and HFC broadband services. There is no reason to presume that consumer demand for fast 
services in Australia and New Zealand will be very different from that exhibited in the United 
States Pew surveys and other OECD countries
54
, so the rapid deployment of the FTTH networks 
will be achieved only by inducing existing broadband consumers with very limited willingness to 
pay substantial premia for speed to substitute to the new networks. The structural separation 
requirements create substantial competitive and cost structure impediments to achieving the 
desired rapid widespread deployment and early uptake. Instead, the rates of uptake will likely be 
substantially lower than under the OECD comparators of Section 2, where there is evidence of 
significant levels of aggressive price discrimination occurring on the nascent fibre networks in 
order to induce customers to switch. Even if the FTTH networks did not face infrastructure 
                                                   
54 Indeed Castalia Strategic Advisors (2008) reported a low willingness to pay for faster broadband in New 
Zealand. 
http://www.iscr.org.nz -- 30 -- 
iscr@vuw.ac.nz 
competition, the separation mandates will mean that the number of connections would be less and 
the average cost per connection higher than under an integrated counterfactual where price 
discrimination was possible.  
 
As the underlying financial case for cost recovery of the Australian and New Zealand networks is 
so precarious, it is hardly surprising that networks of the specified technology will be built only 
with the assistance of government subsidies. However, the structural separation mandate in 
particular imposes a set of costs and impediments that will result in that subsidy having to be both 
very much larger, and applied over a much longer period of time, than if a more flexible view was 
taken of the optimal institutional structure of and the pricing options available to the firms 
providing FTTH services. Nonetheless, it is apposite at this point to examine each of the 
Australian and New Zealand proposals separately, in order to form a view of the extent to which 
the unique characteristics of each may affect both the relative and absolute sizes of government 
support that will be necessary to create and maintain the networks envisaged.  
 
3.3.1 The New Zealand Proposal 
The New Zealand proposal requires the UFBCos to sell dark fibre (Layer 1) services at a single 
non-discriminatory price to all access seekers. Access seekers could be Layer 2 wholesalers, 
integrated Layer 2/3 providers or even end users. It is not clear whether there will be a single 
nationwide price for dark fibre, or one that varies by region.  
 
Layer 2 wholesalers will determine the variety of different speeds of internet access that will 
ultimately be sold to end consumers by Layer 3 providers. The single price for Layer 1 services, 
which comprise around 70% of the fixed costs of the network, must be set by the Layer 1 
operator(s) (or regulator) ex ante, without knowledge of the range of speeds that the Layer 2 
operators will make available, or access to the information regarding how consumers at the Layer 
3 level value access to the network.  A „guess‟ must be made about how many connections will 
be sold in order to determine the single price.  If actual demand is less than that estimated, the 
Layer 1 operator will be unable to recover costs (of course, errors in the other direction are likely 
to result in a reduction in the regulated price for services to be made available).  As Layer 2 
operators do not bear the costs of Layer 1 investment, they have a strong incentive to 
„overestimate‟ the number of connections they will sell in order to encourage the Layer 1 operator 
(or regulator) to believe scale economies can be achieved, and therefore to set the single price 
lower.  This leads to systematic errors in price setting in separated natural monopoly networks 
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that are avoided when the risks of demand estimation errors can be internalised (eliminated) via 
integration
55
.  
 
Layer 2 wholesalers control the choice of speed offerings made available (i.e. the degree of 
product differentiation offered on the network to enable segmentation of retail customers) and 
will set (or a regulator may set) the prices charged to non-integrated Layer 3 retailers. Whilst 
Layer 2 wholesalers face some fixed costs of their own, and therefore face an incentive to 
structure their (Ramsey-Boiteux) prices accordingly in order to maximise scale economies as they 
relate to their own production costs, they have neither the ability nor the incentive to structure 
their prices in order to maximise the scale economies available to the Layer 1 operator. 
Furthermore, as they have no direct interaction with retail customers, they are limited in their 
ability to discern end customers‟ willingness to pay for various service speeds and qualities and 
hence to structure either their speed-differentiated offerings or prices optimally. Instead, they 
must rely upon on either at best the information provided by or willingness to pay of their Layer 3 
customers as a proxy for retail consumer valuations in order to set imperfect Ramsey-Boiteux 
prices, or at worst must accept regulated, cost-based prices that will effectively eliminate their 
ability to garner any benefits of price discrimination for either themselves or the Layer 1 operator. 
In either case, their ability to use pricing to optimise network welfare is considerably constrained.  
 
Ultimately, it is the Layer 3 operators who hold the key to setting prices and recovering the costs 
of deployment at all layers of the network.  Fully separate Layer 3 operators have neither the 
ability to pass through any proceeds of retail price discrimination to Layer 1 or 2 operators nor 
the incentives to set their prices so as to maximise network efficiency.  However, as they manage 
the customer relationship, they have all of the information and ability to engage in price 
discrimination for profit-maximising purposes. As for Layer 2 operators, they have no incentives 
to truthfully share their information about likely end consumer demand patterns to their upstream 
suppliers if doing so will result in reductions in their profits (for example, by leading to a higher 
price for services).  This likewise exposes separate Layer 2 operators to risks in respect of setting 
their costs and quantities.  If there are no restrictions on vertical integration between Layer 2 and 
3 operators, there are strong incentives for Layer 2 operators to vertically integrate downstream 
into Layer 3 operations in order to internalise the risk.  Integrated Layer 2/3 operators thus have 
substantial cost/risk advantages over separate operators, as well as the advantage of being able to 
use price discrimination to recover the share of fixed costs incurred at Layer 2, suggesting that 
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unless there are further forcible separations, the New Zealand market will likely converge to a 
small number of integrated Layer 2/3 operators competing under a Cournot-style oligopoly model  
rather than a large number of separate operators at each layer competing under Bertrand-style 
competition.  
 
Separate Layer 3 operators are therefore likely to emerge only with regulatory support (e.g. 
forcible separation or price regulations requiring integrated operators to make Layer 2 products 
available at equivalent terms to competitors and integrated operations, as per access regulation), 
or if there are other compelling commercial advantages that enable them to be profitable despite 
having to pay higher prices due to the higher risks imposed by separation. As consumer 
willingness to pay is based upon the bundle of network capabilities and application features, 
separated Layer 3 operators have the means to engage in price discrimination (for example, 
judicious bundling of specific applications and network speeds) for the purposes of individual 
profit maximisation. A likely consequence is adverse selection, where specific Layer 3 operators 
can use targeted applications to „cherry pick‟ high-valuing (and likely high-speed purchasing) 
consumers from low-valuing ones, and extract both the network speed and application premia 
from them, rather than using the proceeds to low-valuing (and likely low-speed purchasing) 
demand-inelastic consumers
56
, who will end up purchasing services in disproportionate numbers 
and at overall higher prices from providers unable to extract a price premium because the demand 
curve of these consumers is essentially flat.  Initially, „cherry-picked‟ price premia will likely be 
extracted as free profits by separate Layer 3 operators. However, in the manner of classic 
monopolistic competition, in the long run the presence of profits will encourage both higher 
levels of Layer 3 (retail) entry and more aggressive development of applications designed to ever 
more finely separate consumers by their willingness to pay than is optimal
57
. The costs for all 
Layer 3 operators will rise, to the point where, at the industry level there will be no net profits 
(the sunk costs of failed market entry and development of applications not highly-valued by 
consumers will balance gains made by successful layer 3 operators). 
 
To date, there has been no explicit articulation of the role that the incumbent DSL network 
operator Chorus, its Telecom Wholesale arm and its retail and unbundling partners (including 
Telecom Retail) will play in the New Zealand FTTH environment. Over 93% of existing fixed-
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line broadband connections sold in New Zealand are provided over Chorus infrastructure. Cable 
operator TelstraClear (7% market share) has already announced that it will be competing for 
broadband customers with UFBCos and their Layer 2 and 3 operators in those geographic 
markets where its HFC infrastructure is deployed. If Chorus and its affiliates were to compete 
aggressively with the UFBCos and their affiliates, then it will be extremely difficult for the FTTH 
network to gain either large numbers of customers or access to scale economies.  
 
Without the ability to use price discrimination strategically to induce network substitution by 
undercutting the cable and DSL operators, the FTTH networks will attract only a very small 
number of vey high-valuing customers. Rather than commercial uptake of fibre services enabling 
the government to recover the capital costs of network construction at an early date, it may be that 
the UFBCos can remain in the market only as long as the government continues to provide 
construction capital. On the other hand, if Chorus becomes part of the FTTH network, and there 
is only limited competition from alternative fixed-line networks (e.g. in locations where 
TelstraClear has a presence), then the FTTH network(s) will have an element of market power, so 
may be able to set prices in order to recover costs. However, consumers will necessarily be 
paying more for fixed-line broadband connections and there will be fewer of them under this 
scenario than under a competitive counterfactual, albeit that the government is able to recover 
taxpayer investments at an earlier date.  
 
3.3.2 The Australian Proposal 
Two key differences distinguish the Australian FTTH proposal from the New Zealand one.  
 
First, rather than imposing separation at Layer 1 as in New Zealand, the Australian proposal 
contains a single, integrated Layer 1 and 2 operator – NBNCo – which will sell a range of 
differentiated services to Layer 3 operators. Whilst the separated NBNCo faces the same 
information disadvantages in setting (optimal) Ramsey prices for the array of services offered to 
Layer 3 operators as the Layer 2 New Zealand firms, the very fact of integration means that, to 
the extent that it is possible, discriminatory prices can be set. NBNCo is therefore able to use its 
price structure to carry out transfers from high-valuing, high-speed consumers to low-valuing, 
low-speed ones in order to gain access to at least some of the scale economies implicit in a cost 
structure that encompasses 90% to 95% of the network‟s fixed costs. The Australian 
arrangements thus offer a very much greater likelihood of accessing available efficiences, and 
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hence (absent competitive pressures) of achieving lower average costs and higher uptake levels 
than are possible under the New Zealand arrangements.  
 
Second, the Australian proposal explicitly eliminates fixed–line broadband market competition 
for NBNCo and its affiliates. The acquisition of existing copper network operator Telstra is a 
fundamental component of the Australian plans. Telstra and its affiliates currently have 80% 
market share in the fixed-line broadband market. Furthermore, the Australian proposals 
specifically allow for NBNCo to engage in strategic price discrimination in those markets 
currently served by competing operators if it is deemed that the elimination of infrastructure 
competition is necessary for the network operator to access cost-reducing scale economies. 
Access to government subsidies will effectively provide NBNCo with the ability to forgo profits 
that its private sector counterparts will find very difficult to counter. The effective elimination of 
infrastructure competition thus grants NBNCo a government-sponsored monopoly position in 
fixed-line broadband access reminiscent of the legislated government-owned monopoly enjoyed 
by fixed-line telephony companies prior to the liberalisation and privatisation that began in the 
1980s.  
 
Whilst there will necessarily be some compromise in the ability of the Australian network to take 
full advantage of integration and retail price discrimination as available under vertical integration, 
it appears much more likely that the ensuing Australian industry structure will be financially self-
sustaining much earlier, and will require substantially less in the way of government subsidies per 
activated connection than the separated structure proposed for New Zealand.  
4. Conclusion 
The Australian and New Zealand governments have both decided that substantial government 
intervention is required to accelerate the deployment of FTTH networks, but have chosen very 
different structural and competitive policies under which the government-subsidised networks 
will be deployed. 
 
The Australian proposal, by allowing integration of Layer 1 and 2 operations, enables the use of a 
price structure that will enable some access to the economies of scale that attend an infrastructure 
with high fixed and very low marginal costs.  Whilst the price discrimination that can be 
undertaken cannot be optimal, due to the separation-imposed barriers to sharing information and 
discriminatory full revenues across the Layer 2/Layer 3 boundary, there is at least some scope for 
transfers to be made from high-valuing, high-speed customers to offset subsidised prices to the 
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larger number of low-valuing low-speed customers in order to increase customer numbers and 
lower average production costs.  The proposal also acknowledges the difficulties of a frontier 
technology competing for customers against strong competitors with existing (legacy) 
infrastructures, in that it takes concrete steps to protect NBNCo from significant infrastructure 
competition at least during the rollout phase.  This will assist NBNCo to manage the substitution 
of customers from the old to the new technologies in such a way that the risks of failing to 
achieve critical customer numbers are minimised 
 
In contrast the New Zealand proposal imposes at the outset a FTTH institutional structure that 
prioritises pursuit of efficiencies arising from competition and product variety at Layer 3 (retai1) 
over pursuit of scale efficiencies in the provision of an infrastructure (Layers 1 and 2) with very 
substantial fixed cost components.  Layer 1 infrastructure providers lack both the ability to 
engage in price discrimination to access scale economies and protection from competing 
providers offering close substitute products on other infrastructures.  This will lead to the dual 
disadvantages of a higher cost structure than their competitors and the demand side risks of being 
unable to take a managed approach to the migration of customers from legacy to frontier 
technologies, as is available to NBNCo in Australia.  The New Zealand structures are therefore 
likely to be both more costly and exposed to greater risk of failure than their Australian 
counterpart.  
 
This is not to say that the Australian proposal would be ideal for either country. Whilst 
competition from fixed line networks may be managed, NBNCo will still face competition from 
cellular and fixed-wireless broadband suppliers with ever more capable networks. These 
competitors will continue to have full control over their structure (i.e. vertical integration or 
separation as economics, not policy determines) and price structure (i.e. unrestricted price 
discrimination based on actual customer demand rather than demand proxied by intermediaries). 
Australian Layer 3 FTTH retailers will still be able to appropriate some of the proceeds of retail 
price discrimination rather than applying them to accelerate the diffusion of FTTH connections.  
 
While there are problems with both proposals, it would seem that the policy objectives are more 
likely to be met sooner and at lower costs in Australia than in New Zealand.  
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